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Abstract 
The notion of ‘secondary movements’ is commonly used to describe the mobility of third country 
nationals for the purpose of seeking international protection in an EU member state other than the 
one of first irregular entry according to the EU Dublin Regulation. Secondary movements are often 
identified as a major insecurity factor undermining the sustainability of the Schengen regime and 
the functioning of the EU Dublin system. Consequently, EU policies have focused on their 
‘criminalisation’, as testified by the range of sanctions included in the 2016 CEAS reform package, 
and on a ‘policing’ approach, which has materialised in the expanded access to data stored in the 
EURODAC database by police authorities, and its future interconnection with other EU databases 
under the 2019 EU Interoperability Regulations.  
This Paper shows that the EU notion of secondary movements is flawed and must be reconsidered 
in any upcoming reform of the CEAS. The concept overlooks the fact that asylum seekers’ mobility 
may be non-voluntary and thus cannot be understood as a matter of ‘free choice’ or in terms of 
‘preferences’ about the member state of destination. Such an understanding is based on the wrong 
assumption that asylum seekers’ decisions to move to a different EU country are illegitimate, as all 
EU member states are assumed to be ‘safe’ for people in need of international protection. 
A key lesson learned from more than twenty years of implementation of the EU Dublin system is 
that the ‘presumption of safety’ between EU member states has been a powerful source of 
protective failures due to dysfunctions of asylum systems in member states to which asylum 
seekers have been transferred according to Dublin criteria. This circumstance has forced asylum 
seekers, subsidiary protection beneficiaries and refugees into situations of destitution, social 
exclusion, extreme poverty, and institutional discrimination. 
The current overriding policy focus on the ‘symptoms’ of onward movements and the emphasis on 
the fact that asylum seekers should not be allowed to ‘choose’ their member state of destination 
has prevented a proper debate on the actual drivers and protection-related motivations that may 
lead protection seekers to move elsewhere inside the EU. Defining onward movements of asylum 
seekers as ‘choices’ or ‘preferences’ disregards the constraints and obstacles that asylum seekers 
face when trying to access adequate and durable protection in the EU. 
Intra-EU mobility of asylum seekers should be de-securitised and de-criminalised. Due 
consideration should be paid to individuals’ legitimate and humanitarian-related reasons for 
seeking protection in a member state different from that of first irregular entry, and protecting 
their privacy as owners of their data held in EU information systems. The Paper puts forward two 
main recommendations: first, the introduction of an individual humanitarian clause amending 
Article 17.2 of the EU Dublin Regulation. This clause would provide asylum seekers with a right to 
request directly to any EU member state an exception to the application of the Dublin Regulation 
based on humanitarian grounds. Second, an effective complaint mechanism enabling access to 
justice to asylum seekers and migrants whose privacy and other fundamental rights might be 
affected by unlawful access and storage of their data in EU interoperable databases. 
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1. Introduction 
Onward movements of asylum seekers inside the EU have featured amongst the top policy 
priorities in recent European Union (EU) responses to cross-border mobility and asylum. The 
concept of ‘secondary movements’ has become a common feature in EU policy documents to 
refer to the mobility of third country nationals for the purpose of seeking international 
protection in an EU member state other than the one of first irregular arrival (Radjenovic, 
2017). 
While high on the EU political agenda in recent years, the objective of limiting and preventing 
asylum seekers’ intra-EU mobility is by no means new. The rationale behind the establishment 
of the Dublin system since the early-1990s, and its focus on allocating the responsibility for 
assessing asylum applications to the countries of first irregular entry into the Schengen 
territory, was to institutionalise already existing ‘safe third country policies’, by deflecting 
asylum claims towards member states located at the EU external borders (Van Selm, 2001; 
Byrne, Noll and Vedsted-Hansen, 2002; Cortinovis, 2018).  
‘Secondary movements’ in the EU context have become more politically salient since summer 
2015 as a consequence of the increase in the number of asylum seekers entering the EU, and 
their mobility to other member states. ‘Fears of secondary movements of asylum seekers’ led 
a group of EU member states (Austria, Germany, Denmark, Sweden and Norway) to reintroduce 
and unlawfully prolong systematic internal border checks within the Schengen Area. The 
decision by their ministries of interior to use the ‘risk of secondary movements’ argument as 
the main political justification to maintain internal border controls has been found to be illegal 
under EU law (Carrera et al., 2018).  
The relevance accorded to secondary movements in EU policy contrasts however with the lack 
of independent evidence on the actual scale and number of people seeking asylum in the EU 
who then move onward after arriving in the member states of first entry. Available statistical 
data suffer from a number of shortcomings and limitations (Wagner et al., 2019; Takle and 
Seeberg, 2015, ch. 4; Guild, 2007).  
While references to ‘secondary movements’ have been widespread in EU policy debates, the 
very appropriateness of this term has been subject to much controversy (UNHCR, 2019).1 The 
label overlooks the fact that onward mobility may be non-voluntary and not a matter of ‘free 
choice’ by asylum seekers. The notion is based on the wrong assumption that intra-EU mobility 
is by itself illegitimate and that asylum seekers have no good reasons to move to a different EU 
country, as all EU member states are assumed to be ‘safe’.2  
 
1 UNHCR prefers using the term ‘onward movements’ rather than ‘secondary movements’ “to reflect the fact that 
such movements may be driven by numerous different factors, and often involve tertiary or multiple stages” 
(UNHCR, 2019). See Section 2 of this Paper for a conceptual analysis.  
2 Therefore, for the purposes of this Paper, the terms ‘onward movements’, ‘intra-EU mobility’, or simply ‘mobility’ 
are used interchangeably when referring to the act of moving by asylum seekers to an EU Member State different 
from the one responsible under the EU Dublin Regulation, which most often corresponds with the country of first 
irregular entry. 
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The containment logic on which the current EU asylum system is anchored (Carrera and 
Cortinovis, 2019) has been widely criticised in light of its ineffectiveness and incompatibility 
with international refugee and human rights standards, including the respect of the principle 
of non-refoulement, family and private life and the prohibition of criminalising asylum seekers 
(Guild et al., 2015; Guild, 2006; Moreno-Lax, 2017). Vedsted-Hansen (2017) has underlined 
how the EU Dublin System has constituted a source of “protective failure” in a context 
characterised by dysfunctional asylum systems in a number of EU member states, a situation 
that has in turn induced asylum seekers to move to other EU countries in search of safety.  
Deterring and preventing asylum seekers’ onward movements across the EU has been 
uncritically incorporated as a key policy goal in several legislative proposals that made up the 
so-called asylum package presented by the Commission in 2016 (European Commission, 2016a, 
2016b, 2016c). The overarching logic on which the Commission approach has been based 
reflects a punitive approach towards asylum seekers’ intra-EU mobility, which includes 
restrictions to asylum seekers’ freedom of movement, increased use of detention and a set of 
sanctions such as the withdrawal of reception conditions for applicants who engage in intra-EU 
movements.  
The criminalisation of asylum seekers’ mobility inside the EU is also reflected in recent 
legislative developments providing law enforcement authorities a widened access to asylum 
seekers’ data stored in EU-wide databases. The proposed expansion of the EURODAC database 
(European Commission, 2016d), coupled with the recently approved Interoperability 
Regulations (Council of the EU, 2019a), which further enlarge police access to asylum seekers’ 
data, raise crucial issues regarding the violation of the right to privacy of the individuals involved 
and their potential criminalisation and discrimination (see section 4.2). 
The increasing involvement of EU agencies (such as eu-LISA, Frontex and EASO) in managing, 
collecting and processing data on asylum seekers’ movements contributes to enacting and 
constructing their mobility as a ‘problem’ or ‘policy issue’, which requires the wider 
mobilisation of EU agencies, expanded access by the latter to EU migration databases, and the 
allocation to these agencies of increased financial resources. In parallel, non-neutral and 
politically-led knowledge production through data and statistics on ‘secondary movements’ is 
likely to further reinforce practices of (in)securitisation in EU border control policies (Bigo, 
2014) and the drive for an expanded and more pervasive use of personal data in EU databases 
designed to monitor these movements (Bigo et al., 2012). 
The current overriding focus on the ‘symptoms’ of asylum seekers’ mobility, without an 
adequate understanding of the actual drivers and protection-related motivations that may lead 
them to move elsewhere, risks perpetuating and solidifying a ‘policing’ approach to intra-EU 
mobility leading to more mistrust and protection failures in the CEAS. 
This Paper problematises and critically reflects on the assumptions behind the EU’s framing of 
intra-EU mobility by asylum seekers as ‘secondary movements’, and the related policy 
responses centred on criminalisation and policing. Section 2 starts by analysing the conceptual 
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premises underpinning EU policies, which frame intra-EU onward movements by people 
seeking international protection as irregular, quasi-criminal and illegitimate.  
Section 3 delves into EU policy responses to address onward movements in the context of the 
2016 proposed reform of the CEAS. These proposals concur to the criminalisation of asylum 
seekers’ intra-EU mobility by introducing a set of penalties towards those breaching the 
obligation to seek asylum in the member state of first entry and moving ‘irregularly’ elsewhere 
in search of international protection. A punitive approach, however, is not only fundamentally 
in tension with international refugee and human rights legal obligations. It is also likely to 
further increase mistrust in the system among asylum seekers and exacerbate serious side 
effects, including increasing situations of marginalisation, destitution and irregularity.   
Section 4 analyses the scope and implications of current dynamics of policing asylum seekers’ 
mobility by focusing on the consequences of the expanded law enforcement or police access 
to asylum seekers’ data in the context of the recently established EU framework on the 
interoperability of databases. Specific attention is paid to the implications of interoperability in 
light of the proposed expansion of the scope of the EURODAC database and its use to tackle 
‘secondary movements’ within the EU. The analysis underlines how recent policy developments 
in the area of EU interoperable databases reflect a data-driven police and criminal justice 
approach to asylum seekers’ mobility, which raise major concerns regarding its compatibility 
with refugee law and other fundamental rights standards (including the right to privacy and 
data protection). 
The Paper concludes by outlining a set of policy options to address identified challenges and 
gaps in EU policies related to asylum seekers’ onward movements. Previous proposals have 
called for ‘choice-based matching models’ that take into account asylum seekers and member 
states’ ‘preferences’ as part of a new EU-wide relocation system. Discussions on the potential 
added-value of ‘preference-matching’ models, however, should consider two central caveats: 
first, the humanitarian constraints and reasons why asylum seekers try to access international 
protection and durable solutions somewhere else in the EU; and second, that member states 
are not free to choose or select applicants based on criteria such as nationality, ethnic origin or 
religion, or even ‘recognition rates’, ‘integration potential’ or 'security grounds', as these clearly 
amount to discrimination prohibited under EU law. The Paper recommends introducing an 
individual humanitarian clause in the Dublin Regulation, providing asylum seekers with the right 
to request directly to any other EU member state an exception on humanitarian grounds to the 
application of the Dublin criteria. It underlines that the way forward should be one focused on 
de-securitising intra-EU mobility and upholding the fundamental rights of asylum and privacy 
of every person in the EU. 
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2. Understanding onward movements in the EU 
2.1 Problematising ‘secondary movements’  
The concept of ‘secondary movements’ relies upon a model presuming a clear-cut 
differentiation between ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ movements of asylum seekers inside the 
Schengen Area. Accordingly, the notion of ‘primary movements’ relies on the idea of the 
involuntariness of individuals’ movements outside their country of origin to seek safety and 
protection in another country. While the latter might be any country different to the one from 
which the individual is fleeing, in the EU context this usually corresponds with the country of 
first irregular entry into the Schengen Area. The first EU country of irregular entry is generally 
considered to be the one responsible for assessing third country nationals’ asylum claims under 
the current EU Dublin Regulation, except in the case of minor applicants or when the family 
criteria foreseen in the Regulation apply.3 
The notion of ‘secondary movements’, on the other hand, is associated with the alleged 
voluntariness of the decision to move onward, specifically to a country other than the one of 
first irregular entry. It is thus considered that asylum seekers choose voluntarily, and therefore 
without solid enough or verified justifications, to move to a Schengen state different from the 
one declared to be responsible for assessing their asylum claim. The assumed ‘voluntariness’ 
of onward movements implies the fact that they are not motivated by a genuine need for 
protection and thus should be considered as illegitimate.   
The current EU conceptualisation of secondary movements as voluntary (and therefore 
illegitimate) relies on the principle of ‘mutual trust’ among member states, which presumes 
that EU member states’ asylum systems are fit to correctly implement EU asylum law. 
According to this presumption, all member states that are part of the Dublin system are 
considered to be a priori ‘safe’ for asylum seekers. The EU Dublin Regulation thus takes for 
granted that there are no legitimate reasons why a person would decide to move to another 
EU country to seek asylum.  
As Figure 1 below illustrates, this assumption implies that onward movements are by default 
considered as ‘irregular’ and, increasingly, quasi-criminal. This in turn justifies restrictive 
migration and asylum management approaches focused on the criminalisation and policing of 
asylum seekers’ onward mobility inside the EU. 
The distinction between ‘primary’ (legitimate) and ‘secondary’ (illegitimate) movements, 
however, needs to be revisited in light of the specific conditions faced by asylum seekers and 
refugees across EU countries. The migration management driven notion of ‘safety’ that 
underpins the functioning of EU asylum policy is flawed as it does not allow to capture the 
 
3 Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the 
criteria and mechanisms for determining the member state responsible for examining an application for 
international protection lodged in one of the member states by a third country national or a stateless person 
(recast), L180/31 29.6.2013, Art. 7-13.  
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whole range of insecurities and risks that individual asylum seekers may face in several EU 
member states. Even if formally labelled as ‘safe’, several EU countries have proved to be de 
facto ‘unsafe’ for asylum seekers. In these circumstances, the decision of individuals to ‘move 
elsewhere’ is not the result of a ‘free choice’; it is rather the consequence of their legitimate 
search for adequate standards of international protection, safety and security of residence. 
Figure 1. Asylum seekers’ mobility to and within the EU: primary vs secondary movements 
 
 Source: Authors’ own elaboration. 
 
A notion of safety grounded in international human rights law should encompass additional 
criteria than those provided in the 1951 Refugee Convention.4 These include, first, the absence 
of degrading reception and living conditions leading to destitution (lack of decent housing), but 
also protection against exclusion from social assistance or cases of extreme material poverty, 
which constitute violations of the absolute prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment 
(FRA, 2017). Insecure residency status, the lack of life opportunities and long-term (permanent) 
 
4 Article 1A (2) of the Geneva Convention defines a refugee as someone who “and owing to well- founded fear of 
being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself 
of the protection of that country”. 
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solutions, including the existence of family and private links can furthermore justify equally 
sound onward mobility (Zimmermann, 2009). Safety also depends on protection against 
systemic and institutionalised discrimination and xenophobia against asylum seekers and 
foreigners (FRA, 2017).  
For EU law purposes, ‘safety’ additionally needs to be viewed in light of the right to seek asylum 
enshrined in Article 18 EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. This EU right is wider in scope than 
the one foreseen in the 1951 Geneva Convention, as it includes additional protection standards 
developed by Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)5 and the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) case law,6 as well as those laid down in secondary EU asylum legislation, 
including measures related to subsidiarity and complementary protection (EASO, 2018).  
Cooperation under the CEAS has been progressively interpreted as being upheld by a form of 
trust that, while being mutual (i.e. based on the reciprocal assumption that each participating 
member state respects the EU asylum acquis), cannot be ‘blind’. The CJEU has confirmed in 
several asylum-related judgements that the automatic presumption of safety among EU 
countries is rebuttable. Several instances have indeed shown that, in practice, member states 
may experience major operational and structural deficiencies (systematic or not) in the 
functioning of their domestic asylum system, and leaving the individual in an intolerable state 
of unsafety.  
Therefore, and similar to other areas of European cooperation governed by EU law, trust “must 
be earned” (Mitsilegas et al., 2019). This means inter alia that transfers carried out in 
application of the EU Dublin Regulation (‘take back’ or ‘take charge’ requests) can be 
successfully challenged by individuals on wider fundamental rights grounds.7 This possibility 
opposes the idea that onward movements are ‘voluntary’ and by default illegitimate.  
2.2 Existing evidence on the ‘causes’ of onward movements  
A preliminary observation to make when discussing the ‘drivers’ or underlying reasons 
impacting asylum seekers’ decisions to seek protection in a specific country is that people 
fleeing a situation of persecution, human rights violations or conflict often have only a very 
limited choice about the intermediary stages of their journey as well as their final destination. 
In spite of the restrictions and constraints characterising the situation of people who are forced 
to leave their country of origin or stay, asylum seekers are nonetheless able to exercise a degree 
of agency regarding their country of destination (Crawley and Hagen-Zanker, 2018). 
 
5 See, for example, Court of Justice of the European Union Press release No 33/19, Judgments in Case C-163/17 
Jawo and in Joined Cases C-297/17, C-318/17 Ibrahim, C-319/17 Sharqawi and Others and C-438/17 Magamadov  
https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2019-03/cp190033en.pdf 
6 See ECtHR, Factsheet – “Dublin” cases, June 2016, https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_Dublin_ENG.pdf 
7 CJEU - Judgment Case C-578/16 PPU C.K. and Others v. Supreme Court of Republic Slovenia; CJEU - C-411-10 and 
C-493-10, Joined cases of N.S. v United Kingdom and M.E. v Ireland. 
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EU discussions about the factors shaping asylum seekers’ motivations for seeking protection in 
a specific member state have often focused on the disparities in asylum standards across 
Europe, which would lead to some countries being ‘preferred’ over others. In line with this 
approach, the then European Commissioner for Migration and Home Affairs Dimitris 
Avramopoulos stated that one of the key aims of the 2016 reform of the CEAS was to prevent 
‘asylum shopping’, that is the situation “when refugees move among EU countries in search of 
the best conditions to apply for asylum”8. In its Communication ‘Towards a reform of the 
Common European Asylum System and enhancing legal avenues to Europe’, the Commission 
underlined how the CEAS is currently characterised by differing treatments of asylum seekers, 
including in terms of the length of asylum procedures and reception conditions across member 
states.  
These divergences result in part from the often discretionary or ‘optional’ provisions contained 
in the EU Asylum Directives, such as the Directive on reception conditions (European 
Commission, 2016c). ‘Optional’ provisions in CEAS legal instruments, such as those limiting 
social assistance and family reunification for beneficiaries of subsidiary protection in the 
Qualification Directive, have led to varying practices across EU member states on substantive 
and procedural matters, which in turn have contributed to onward movements (Vedsted-
Hansen, 2017). 
The Commission further recognised that, while the Qualification Directive sets out the 
standards for recognition and protection to be offered at EU level, recognition rates vary 
between member states in practice. Also, available data points to a lack of adequate 
convergence as regards the decision to grant either refugee status or subsidiary protection 
status to applicants coming from the same country of origin. The communication concluded 
that such divergences should be considered as important factors leading asylum seekers to 
undertake free movement. 
However, lack of harmonisation of EU asylum standards across member states, including 
reception conditions and criteria for granting international protection, is just one of the facts 
contributing to shaping the dynamics of intra-EU mobility by people seeking international 
protection. The previous section of this Paper has highlighted how the quality of international 
protection in a specific country (and thus the possibility of the latter to be considered ‘safe’ for 
an individual asylum seeker) may be influenced by a broader set of social, institutional and 
economic conditions, which go beyond the existence of adequate asylum procedures and 
reception standards.  
This same conclusion is supported by an expanding body of academic literature focusing on the 
decisions made by refugees at various stages of their mobility trajectories, and the underlying 
 
8 “EU aims to stop ‘asylum shopping’ Commission proposes reforms for dealing with refugees”, Politico, 4 
September 2016, https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-aims-to-stop-asylum-shopping-refugee-crisis/. In the EU 
context, ‘asylum shopping’ refers to the phenomenon where a third country national applies for asylum in more 
than one EU member state with or without having already received international protection in one of those EU 
member states (European Commission, 2008).  
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factors influencing those decisions. This body of literature examines the relationship between 
policies and destination preferences, underlying the importance of ‘non-policy’ related drivers 
of onward movements. A review of research since 1997 looking at the factors determining 
asylum seekers destination choices underlines that factors that influence asylum seekers’ 
choices about their destination countries are less often related to public policies than to other 
factors such as the presence of social networks and histories of colonialism (James and Mayblin, 
2016).  
Along the same line, Takle and Seeberg (2015) conclude their review by pointing out that the 
dynamics of onward movements within the EU are better explained by the interplay of a range 
of individual, transnational and national factors, including the location of the existence of family 
and private links, knowledge of and familiarity with different European languages, and the 
prospect for sustainable and durable life opportunities. Moreover, Collyer (2004) showed how 
mobility may be motivated by other additional factors related to “historical complexities…[and] 
to similar nationally specific or post-colonial relationships with particular Member States”, and 
highlighted that in any case “a first consideration in any analysis of the choice asylum seekers 
make must be the absence of choice”. 
Empirical evidence on the ‘drivers’ of asylum seekers’ movements reviewed above therefore 
shows how the containment logic upon which the EU Dublin system is based is flawed, bringing 
into question the effectiveness of policies aimed at deterring asylum seekers’ mobility and 
disregarding an individual’s personal circumstances, needs and reasons for seeking protection 
in a specific country.  
This same conclusion was reflected in a 2015 evaluation of the Dublin Regulation commissioned 
by the European Commission, which underlined how the lack of adequate consideration for the 
interests/needs of applicants in the current Dublin criteria for allocating responsibility should 
be listed among the causes of secondary movements and the lodging of multiple applications 
within the EU. The evaluation further underlined how family criteria have been seldom used in 
practice in the implementation of Dublin and the identification of the responsible state has 
been almost exclusively based on the first country of irregular entry criteria, which however is 
an irrelevant factor in relation to applicants’ needs and personal circumstances (Maas et al., 
2015). 
3. Criminalising asylum seekers’ mobility:  
Punitive approaches in the CEAS reform 
The Commission identified the tackling of ‘secondary movements’ as a stand-alone policy 
priority to be pursued in order not to disrupt the ‘first country of irregular entry’ logic of the 
Dublin system and prevent ‘asylum shopping’ (European Commission, 2016a). In line with this 
objective, provisions to prevent onward movements have been included by the Commission in 
several of the legislative proposals that made up the so-called 2016 “asylum package”, in 
particular in the recast Dublin Regulation, and the recast of the Reception Conditions Directive.  
WHEN MOBILITY IS NOT A CHOICE | 9 
 
The proposal for reforming the Dublin Regulation presented on May 2016 (European 
Commission, 2016b) includes a new obligation for international protection seekers to apply in 
the member state of first irregular entry (Art. 4 of the proposal). According to the Commission, 
the aim of this provision is to clarify that an asylum applicant neither has the right to choose the 
member state of application nor the member state responsible for examining the application. 
The proposal lays down a number of procedural and material sanctions in case of non-
compliance. These include the mandatory use of the accelerated procedure by the responsible 
member state, as well as the withdrawal of reception conditions (with the exception of 
emergency health care) in any member state other than the one responsible (Art. 5).  
At the same time, the proposal promotes the ‘stabilisation’ of responsibility for asylum claims 
by deleting the 12-month time-limit for the applicability of the illegal entry criterion (Article 15 
of the proposal). In addition, it foresees the abolition of the conditions for “cessation of 
responsibility” contained in Article 19 of the current Dublin Regulation, including in the case of 
an applicant who has left the territory of the EU for a period exceeding 3 months (former Art. 
19). According to the Commission, these revisions would represent a significant tool for 
streamlining responsibility criteria and preventing secondary movements (European 
Commission, 2016b). However, during negotiations of the file, a group of southern member 
states heavily criticised the introduction of permanent or prolonged responsibility for asylum 
claims for the state of first entry, arguing that this provision would substantially increase the 
number of claims under their responsibility (ECRE, 2018).  
A number of provisions to reduce “reception-related incentives for secondary movements 
within the EU” are also included in the proposal for a recast reception conditions directive 
presented in July 2016 (European Commission, 2016c). These include restrictions on asylum 
seekers’ free movement by requiring member states to assign a specific place of residence to 
applicants, to impose reporting obligations and to make the provision of material reception 
conditions subject to the actual residence by the applicant in a specific place, if this is 
considered necessary for the swift processing of the Dublin procedure, or in order to effectively 
prevent the applicant from absconding (Art. 7.2).  
An additional ground for detention of asylum seekers has also been added to tackle secondary 
movements and absconding of applicants. If an applicant has been assigned a specific place of 
residence, but has not complied with this obligation, and where there is a risk of absconding, 
the applicant must be detained in order to ensure the fulfilment of the obligation to reside in 
a specific place (Art.8.3(c)). 
Stakeholders have raised concerns as to the restrictive and punitive character of measures 
aimed at addressing onward movements advanced included in the Commission’s proposals. 
Restrictions to the fundamental right of free movement and liberty of asylum seekers, in 
particular, create tension with international law, including the principle of non-penalisation of 
refugees and asylum seekers included in Article 31 of the 1951 Geneva Convention, as well as 
fundamental rights standards included in the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) 
and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (EU CFR). 
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The European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE) has underlined how the exclusion of 
applicants who engage in secondary movements from an entitlement to reception conditions 
in a member state other than the one responsible under the proposed Dublin reform 
contradicts the principle of entitlement to reception conditions as a corollary of asylum seeker 
status elaborated by the CJEU (ECRE, 2016). In Cimade and Gisti9, the CJEU found that the rights 
to dignity and asylum under Articles 1 and 18 of the CFR implies that the Directive should be 
applicable (in its entirety) to all asylum seekers who have a right to remain on the territory of 
the member states. As a consequence, it appears that introducing limitations on the 
applicability of the Directive on the sole basis of the non-compliance with provisions of the 
Dublin Regulation undermines compliance with basic fundamental rights standards. 
Doubts also arise with regard to the legality of provisions to restrict asylum seekers’ 
fundamental right to freedom of movement (which is guaranteed under both the EU CFR and 
the ECHR) on the basis of administrative reasons, and namely the effective monitoring of the 
asylum procedure or the Dublin procedure. Also, grounds for detention included in the 
Commission proposal are in tension with the right to liberty under Art. 6 of the EU CFR, as they 
are not connected to the fulfilment of a concrete obligation incumbent on the applicant or are 
punitive in nature (ECRE, 2016).  
In its reports on the recast Dublin Regulation and recast reception conditions directive, the LIBE 
Committee of the European Parliament put forward a number of amendments that delete or 
limit several of the punitive measures described above. The EP stressed how the objective of 
reducing secondary movements should be achieved through an approach based on positive 
incentives rather than punitive measures, first of all by promoting high quality reception 
conditions at the same level throughout the EU (European Parliament, 2017a). Furthermore, in 
its Report on the Recast Dublin Regulation, the EP has put forward a number of proposals to 
ensure voluntary compliance of applicants with the rules. These include the possibility to 
provide applicants with a limited choice in the identification of the member state of destination 
in the framework of the envisaged collective allocation system. According to the EP report, this 
provision would give applicants ‘some say’ in the procedure and reduce the risk of secondary 
movements (European Parliament, 2017b).  
None of the proposals for the reform of the CEAS presented by the Commission in 2016 could 
be finalised before the expiry of the 2014-2019 parliamentary term due to the choice of 
member states to stick to a logic of consensus and to discuss the asylum reform as a ‘package’ 
(Carrera and Cortinovis, 2019). While the fate of the CEAS reform as a whole as well as that of 
single legislative files is still unclear (Pollet, 2019) it may be expected that the issue of onwards 
 
9 CJEU, Case C-179-11 Cimade and Gisti v Ministre de l’Intérieur, Judgment of 27 September 2012, 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=127563&doclang=EN 
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movements of asylum seekers within the EU will continue to be prominent in future initiatives 
to reform EU asylum rules.10  
4. Policing asylum seekers’ data  
4.1 EURODAC as a policing tool 
EURODAC offers a clear example of how data-based technology has progressively become a 
key component for the functioning not only of the Dublin system, but also of the so-called 
‘Integrated Border Management Strategy (IBM)’11 and, more broadly, of the EU Agenda on 
Security (Commission, 2019). 
Since its creation, EURODAC has allowed collection and collation of biometric data (i.e. 
fingerprints) of asylum seekers and individuals apprehended in connection with irregular 
border-crossings, or in a situation of irregular stay. Looking at the rationale and dynamics 
behind EURODAC’s inception, some authors noted how this biometric identification system has 
been specifically designed to serve the purpose of preventing third country nationals from 
‘deliberately concealing their identity’ (Aus, 2006). 
The analysis of inter-institutional discussions that led to the establishment of EURODAC back in 
2000 revealed how the envisaged system represented from the very outset an EU-level 
response to political concerns raised by the interior ministers of some member state over 
“irregular international migratory movements which seemed to undermine the effective 
application of the Dublin Convention” (Aus, 2006). Fears of onward movements of asylum 
seekers from first EU countries of entry (e.g. Italy and Greece) to other member states (e.g. 
Germany, Sweden) led EU policymakers to introduce compulsory rules subjecting migrants and 
asylum seekers to compulsory biometric identification processes. 
People whose data can be inserted in the EURODAC system are currently classified in three 
distinct categories. The first category is represented by applicants for international protection. 
The second category consists of third country nationals or stateless persons apprehended while 
irregularly crossing an EU external border. The third category comprises third country nationals 
or stateless persons found “illegally staying” in the territory of a member state.12 
 
10 See Ursula von der Leyen, President-elect of the European Commission. Mission letter to Ylva Johansson, 
Commissioner-designate for Home Affairs, Brussels, 10 September 2019, 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/mission-letter-ylva-johansson_en.pdf 
11 Art. 4 of Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 (European Border and Coast Guard Regulation) describes the main 
components of the IBM, which include at point (i) the “use of state-of-the-art technology including large-scale 
information systems”. 
12 Regardless of the category, fingerprint sets can only be collected and transmitted via EURODAC if the third 
country national or stateless person concerned is at least 14 years old. See Regulation (EU) No 603/2013 of the 
European Council and of the Parliament of 26 June 2013 on the establishment of EURODAC for the comparison of 
fingerprints for the effective application of Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms 
for determining the member state responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in 
one of the member states by a third country national or a stateless person and on requests for the comparison 
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The current EURODAC Regulation prescribes different retention periods, which vary depending 
on the categories of persons whose data is collected, transmitted and/or compared via this 
database. While data of individuals seeking asylum (category one) are kept in the database’s 
central system for 10 years, data of subjects apprehended by competent authorities in 
connection with irregularly crossing of the EU external border (category two) are only retained 
for 18 months. Fingerprints of irregularly staying third country nationals (category three) are 
instead not retained. Member states may only transmit to EURODAC fingerprints of this last 
category of data subjects to check if the person found in a situation of irregularity within their 
territory has previously lodged an application for international protection or irregularly crossed 
the EU external border.  
As the Commission clarified: “the current EURODAC Regulation is not concerned with storing 
information on irregular migrants for longer that what is necessary to establish the first country 
of irregular entry under the Dublin Regulation if an asylum application has been lodged in a 
second Member State” (European Commission, 2016d). This remark confirms that the primary 
objective of EURODAC was, and allegedly remains, that of enabling member state asylum 
authorities as well as national and EU and border management actors to compare the 
fingerprints of asylum seekers and irregular migrants in order to facilitate the issuing and 
execution of ‘take charge’ and ‘take back’ requests. EURODAC is thus intrinsically instrumental 
to the enforcement of the Dublin rules through the storing and comparison of asylum seekers 
and migrants’ data. 
Previous scholarly research has shown how the logic of mobility control underlying EURODAC 
has witnessed a process of progressive strengthening and transformation (Bigo et al., 2012). 
From a database originally intended exclusively to assist asylum authorities in the 
determination of the EU country responsible for taking charge or taking back asylum seekers, 
it became a fully-fledged law enforcement tool which responds to police and internal security 
logics and objectives. Since 2013, member state law enforcement authorities and Europol – the 
EU law enforcement agency facilitating the exchange of criminal intelligence between police, 
customs and security services – can in fact access this database ‘to help them fight terrorism 
and serious crime’ (European Parliament, 2013). 
The incorporation of these new security functions into EURODAC has been deplored by EU 
bodies and representatives of civil society alike. The European Data Protection Supervisor 
(EDPS) questioned the very justification and necessity of the decision to enable law 
enforcement access to EURODAC, given that police authorities already had the possibility to 
make use of biometric data (through SIS) to perform their functions (EDPS, 2010).  
International immigration, refugee and criminal law experts decried the changes introduced in 
the 2013 revision of EURODAC Regulation as a violation of ‘fundamental rights of asylum 
seekers, including the right to privacy and data protection, the right to asylum and protection 
 
with Eurodac data by member state law enforcement authorities and Europol for law enforcement purposes, and 
amending Regulation (EU) No 1077/2011 establishing a European Agency for the operational management of 
large-scale IT systems in the area of freedom, security and justice (recast), OJ L180/1. 
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against torture and inhuman treatment’ that are enshrined in EU and international human 
rights law (Meijers Committee, 2009). Further analysis has been developed to show how the 
2013 amendments to the EURODAC legislation expose asylum seekers –a group of vulnerable 
individuals per se – to risks of stigmatisation, in stark contradiction with the principle of non-
discrimination (Meijers Committee, 2012). 
Such concerns have, however, not prevented EURODAC from being remodelled into a system 
subjecting asylum seekers to law enforcement and preventive policing logics (Bhatia, 2015), 
most notably on the basis of the assumed inauthenticity of identities and for controlling 
movement and behaviour, ‘in a way analogous to controlling the bodies of criminals’ (Griffiths, 
2012). Similar logics, unfortunately, also appear to inspire the most recent Commission 
proposal for a reform of EURODAC (European Commission, 2016d). Quite telling, for instance, 
is the possibility envisaged by the proposal to provide law enforcement authorities with access 
to EURODAC information in a way that ensures that all three categories of data stored in the 
EURODAC Central System can be compared.13 
The new proposal, which has been tabled as part of the EU legislative package for reforming 
the CEAS (see section 3 above), would inter alia lower the age limit for data collection (from 14 
to 6 years old), and add new categories to the data stored in the system, including facial images. 
According to the proposal, EURODAC “will prime the system for searches to be made with facial 
recognition software in the future” (European Commission, 2016d). New and extended 
retention periods (5 years) are furthermore proposed for data pertaining to irregular border 
crossers (category 2 data) and irregular stayers (category 3 data).14 According to the 
explanatory memorandum to the proposal, the storage of new types of personal data for longer 
periods is intended to allow immigration and asylum authorities to “easily identify an individual, 
without the need to request this information directly from another Member State”. 
Besides supporting the Dublin Regulation, Art. 1(1)(b) of the proposal addresses an additional 
objective, namely “to assist with the control of illegal immigration to and secondary 
movements within the Union” and the “identification of illegally staying third country 
nationals” for the purposes of removal and repatriation. The table below shows how, in 
addition to foreseeing the collection of new categories of biometric and alphanumeric data,15 
and expanding the scope of application of the EURODAC legislation ratione personae, the 
Commission’s proposal also envisages the extension of EURODAC to return and deportation-
related functionalities and purposes. 
  
 
13 Art. 20(3) of the EURODAC proposal. 
14 Recital 33 of the EURODAC proposal.  
15 Art. 1(1) of the EURODAC proposal, in particular, envisages storing fingerprints and other alphanumerical data 
(e.g. biographical data) pertaining to third country nationals or stateless persons found illegally staying in a 
member state for a period of five years. 
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Table 1. 2016 EURODAC reform proposal: new envisaged functionalities, related purposes and 
potential beneficiaries 
Functionalities Corresponding purpose(s) Stakeholders/Users 
 
Store & search data 
of irregularly 
staying migrants 
(Cat. 3) to compare 
them with other 
categories of 
EURODAC data 
(cat. 1-3). 
• Transmit and compare data on illegally staying third 
country nationals “who do not claim asylum and who 
may move around the EU undetected” 
• Accelerate procedures for identification of “illegally 
staying third county nationals apprehended and 
fingerprinted in another MS” 
• Assist MS to re-document a third country national for 
return purposes  
• Reduce length of return and readmission procedures 
• Carry out individual assessment of the situation of 
irregular migrants (e.g. risk that they may abscond)  
• MS migration & 
border 
authorities 
• EBCG Teams 
• Frontex return 
teams 
• MS asylum 
experts deployed 
at EU external 
borders under 
the auspices of 
EASO 
 
Marking data of 
irregularly staying 
TCNs after they 
obtain a residence 
permit 
• Allow the authorities of member state where a TCN is 
found in situation of irregularity to ascertain that 
he/she has been given a residence permit by another 
EU member state 
• Assist member states that issued residence permit to 
re-document a third country national for return 
purposes  
• ‘Pass back’ the individual to the member state that 
issued the residence permit 
• MS police 
authorities 
conducting 
checks within 
Schengen Area  
• MS migration 
authorities & 
border guards 
 
Transfers of data to 
third countries 
• Allow identifying third countries of transit, “where the 
illegally staying third country national may be 
readmitted”  
• Share information on irregular third country nationals 
with their country of origin “when a travel document 
needs to be secured” 
• Facilitate readmission and return procedures 
• MS migration & 
border 
authorities 
• EBCG Teams 
• Frontex return 
teams 
 
According to the Commission, the suggested changes in functionality would allow “the 
competent immigration authorities of a member state to transmit and compare data on those 
illegally staying third country nationals who do not claim asylum and who may move around 
the European Union undetected”. The information obtained should facilitate competent 
member state authorities (including authorities different from those responsible for migration 
and asylum) in the task of identifying irregularly staying third country nationals on their territory 
for return purposes, in particular by providing “precious elements of evidence for re-
documentation and readmission purposes”.16 
 
16 Explanatory memorandum to the EURODAC proposal, p. 12. 
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The possibility foreseen in Art. 38 of the proposal to transfer data to third countries is one of 
the most concerning implications of the proposed EURODAC reform. Giving member state 
authorities the possibility to transfer data to a third country for the purpose of facilitating 
readmission and return procedures means that the data of individuals escaping from 
persecution could (directly, or through onward data transfers) reach the country of origin from 
which they are fleeing. Such a scenario appears to be clearly in tension with EU and member 
state obligations to protect asylum seekers in light of Article 18 of the EU Charter. Such a 
possibility might also further fuel mistrust of asylum seekers vis-à-vis EURODAC and increase 
their reluctance to have their data recorded and stored in the system.  
The possibilities to transfer data to third countries envisaged in the proposal also threaten 
asylum seekers’ rights to privacy, data protection, and their possibility to access effective 
remedies under EU primary and secondary law. It is in fact not clear how affected individuals 
could effectively exercise their data protection rights (e.g. the rights of access, correction and 
erasure) once the data have been transferred to third countries’ authorities. This new form of 
data processing would furthermore seriously reduce the possibility for competent oversight 
actors (and most notably national data protection authorities) to monitor compliance of data 
processing with relevant EU data protection legislation. 
Under EU law, transfer of data to a third country is only allowed when specific data protection 
principles and requirements are met. While the first chiefly concern the legality, necessity and 
proportionality of the transfer, the second are detailed respectively in Art. 61 of the General 
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)17 and Article 50 of Directive 2016/680 on protecting 
personal data processed for the purpose of criminal law enforcement.18 The powers of the 
Commission and the standards to be respected when exchanging personal data with third 
countries as part of an activity falling within the scope of EU law have been progressively 
clarified by the CJEU. Above all, data can be transferred to a third country only when the latter 
ensures an adequate level of protection of fundamental rights, as protected by EU secondary 
law, read in light of the Charter.19 This might also explain why sharing information with a third 
country, international organisation or private entity is strictly prohibited under the current 
EURODAC Regulation.20  
 
17 See Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the 
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such 
data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (Text with EEA relevance) OJ L 119, 
4.5.2016, p. 1–88. 
18 Directive 2016/680 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by 
competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal 
offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and on the free movement of such data, OJ L 119/89, 4.5.2016. 
19 Case C-362/14, Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner, Judgment of 6 October 2015. 
20 The standing legislation also strictly forbids access to EURODAC by a third country which is not a party to the 
Dublin Regulation, nor are member states allowed to check data on behalf of a third country. 
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4.2 Interoperability: ‘breaking the silos’ to policing asylum? 
The proposed changes to the EURODAC legislation cannot be seen in isolation from the wider 
EU initiative concerning the so-called interoperability framework. 
On 11 June 2019, after expeditious inter-institutional negotiations, the EU adopted two 
Regulations on Interoperability between EU borders and security information systems.21 The 
establishment of the new data collection and information sharing framework has been mainly 
justified by the need to improve security in the EU. The interoperability framework is 
admittedly intended to break operational and technical silos by allowing different databases to 
“talk to each other” for the sake of “more efficient checks at external borders”. Interoperability 
is in particular deemed to “improve detection of multiple identities and help prevent and 
combat illegal migration” (Council of the EU, 2019a, 2019b).  
The databases falling under the scope of the Interoperability Regulations currently include: the 
Entry/Exit System (EES); the European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS); 
the European Criminal Records Information System for Third Country Nationals (ECRIS-TCN); 
the Schengen Information Systems (SIS); the Visa Information System (VIS); and EURODAC.  
A general feature of the interoperability initiative is the creation of links between data sets that 
until now had to be stored and used for sector-specific goals (Curtin, 2017). The main objective 
underlying these regulations is to allow for the interconnection between several existing EU 
databases for security, border and migration (Alegre et al., 2017). The operationalisation of 
interoperability will entail a ‘de-compartmentalisation’ of existing EU information systems 
originally created for different purposes and serving specific policy objectives (Vavoula, 2019).  
On the other hand, a key risk raised by such an initiative is the definitive blurring of boundaries 
between different policy areas, in particular between the fields of migration, asylum, internal 
security, police cooperation and criminal justice. Scholars have noted that this blurring of 
boundaries between various databases has significant consequences for fundamental rights, in 
particular in light of the possibility it gives to create profiles of individuals pre-identified as 
‘dangerous’, based on constantly ongoing risk assessments conducted in line with the so-called 
preventive justice model (Mitsilegas, 2017). The inclusion of EURODAC in the framework of 
interoperability, in particular, implies that a database initially conceived to store asylum 
seekers’ biometrics for the purpose of assisting in the determination of the state responsible 
for processing an asylum application under the Dublin system, will become interconnected with 
 
21 Regulation (EU) 2019/817 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2019 on establishing a 
framework for interoperability between EU information systems in the field of borders and visa and amending 
Regulations (EC) No 767/2008, (EU) 2016/399, (EU) 2017/2226, (EU) 2018/1240, (EU) 2018/1726 and (EU) 
2018/1861 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Decisions 2004/512/EC and 2008/633/JHA; 
Regulation (EU) 2019/818 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2019 on establishing a 
framework for interoperability between EU information systems in the field of police and judicial cooperation, 
asylum and migration and amending Regulations (EU) 2018/1726, (EU) 2018/1862 and (EU) 2019/816. 
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other large-scale information systems, such as SIS, serving exclusively law enforcement 
functions.  
It is often claimed that the new Interoperability Regulations do not formally modify already 
granted access rights as set out in the legal basis relevant for each database included in the 
system (Council, 2019a). However, changes introduced by the new rules should not be 
underestimated, since they will drastically modify the ways in which data pertaining to asylum 
seekers, refugees as well as migrants and people on the move will be used for a wide range of 
policy goals and corresponding operational activities. Interoperability will in fact expand the 
use currently made of such information, in particular by introducing new possibilities to process 
third country nationals’ data and attaching to the latter new purposes and meanings. 
It will do so through the creation of new information management and exchange tools enabling 
“multiple horizontal interactions between authorities in different Member States”, as well as 
“vertical interactions between national authorities and EU agencies” (Galli, 2019). These 
interactions will rely on a number of new instruments devised to enable the aggregated use of 
data inputted in the already existing databases. In particular, interoperability is designed to 
enable checks on whether data on an individual is stored in one of the six EU databases. 
First, the European Search Portal (ESP) will make it possible to query the databases 
simultaneously and obtain combined results. The ESP will indicate to the authorities performing 
the query in which of the different interconnected databases the information is held. 
Authorities having access to at least one of the interconnected databases will be able to 
perform searches through the ESP. For instance, asylum and border authorities will be able to 
query the ESP and see if data related to an asylum seeker being identified are stored in other 
EU databases, such as SIS.  
Second, the Common Identity Repository (CIR) will store an individual file for each person 
registered in the systems. The CIR will contain both biometric and biographical data as well as 
a reference indicating the system from which the data were retrieved. CIR will aggregate 
biographical and identity information (e.g. names, dates of birth, passport numbers) and 
biometrics (fingerprints and facial scans) taken from different databases (i.e. ECRIS-TCN, EES, 
EURODAC, ETIAS and VIS) and make such data available to border and migration authorities as 
well as to law enforcement actors. It has been estimated that CIR will hold the biometric and 
biographic data of up to 300 million non-EU nationals (Jones, 2019). 
Third, the Biometric Matching Service (BMS) will generate and store templates from all 
biometric data collected in existing databases (all, except ETIAS, currently contain these type 
of data), and thus replace separate searches in the other databases. Finally, the Multiple 
Identity Detector (MID) will use the alphanumeric data stored in the CIR and the SIS II to detect 
multiple identities. The MID will thus create links between identical data to indicate whether 
the individual is lawfully registered in more than one system or whether identity fraud is 
suspected (Vavoula, 2019).  
18 | CARRERA, STEFAN, CORTINOVIS & LUK 
 
The interoperability framework is scheduled to become operational by 2023. However, 
member states have already raised doubts concerning the possibility of implementing the 
project within the intended timeline. Germany’s Federal Ministry of the Interior has for 
instance flagged that “resource bottlenecks”, risk “overloading of the authorities involved”, and 
that “problems in recruiting specialist staff” are likely to challenge the possibility of putting 
interoperability into practice.22 The Commission recently reported that “procurement and 
resources present challenges” in several EU countries. As of October 2019, it was found that 
some member states had not yet a secured budget allocation and sometimes not even an 
identification of funding needs for some components of the future interoperability (Council of 
the EU, 2019c).  
The Commission repeatedly restated the “utmost priority not to lose any time in the design, 
development and implementation of the new systems and interoperability”. And yet, 
“coordinating and cooperating across all the different national authorities involved in projects, 
such as those dealing with EES/VIS/ETIAS at operational level” allegedly “presents a challenge”. 
In such a context, the risk exists that interoperability will face similar, if not worse, 
implementation difficulties and deficiencies previously encountered in the context of similar 
projects (and in particular the SIS II), which were seriously affected by operational delays, 
escalating budget, political crises and criticisms of the potential impact on fundamental rights 
(Parkin, 2011). 
4.2.1 Overexpansion of law enforcement access to asylum seekers and migrants’ data 
Before the entry into force of the Interoperability Regulations, police authorities’ possibility to 
access and make use of data contained in EU databases (i.e. VIS, EURODAC, ETIAS, EES) was 
allowed, but only following authorisation by the competent authorities, and linked to the 
performance of a limited set of law enforcement activities,23 and most notably: the prevention, 
detection and investigation of terrorist offences and other serious criminal offences (see Figure 
2 below).  
With the entry into force of the interoperability framework, law enforcement authorities’ 
ability to make use of refugees’, asylum seekers’, and migrants’ data will be significantly 
enhanced. As illustrated in Figure 2 below, Europol and member state authorities competent 
for the performance of such functions will in fact be given the possibility to simultaneously 
check through the European Search Portal (ESP) whether data on an individual is stored in any 
of the six EU databases mentioned above. 
 
 
22 See ‘Europäisches IT-Großprojekt verzögert sich’, Presse Augsburg, 4 October 2019, https://presse-
augsburg.de/europaeisches-it-grossprojekt-verzoegert-sich/496818/  
23 The rules were different for the performance of border control-related activities, which allowed access to EU 
systems for identification purposes. Activities performed in the context of border controls and migration 
management (including cases where the person to be identified is present) justified access to most systems, with 
no specific restrictions. 
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Figure 2. Law enforcement authorities (LEAs) access to EURODAC and migration databases for 
the “fight against serious crime and terrorism” without and with interoperability 
 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration. 
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Furthermore, Article 22 of the Interoperability Regulations provides that “where there are 
reasonable grounds to believe that consultation of EU information systems will contribute to 
the prevention, detection or investigation of terrorist offences or other serious criminal 
offences” the designated authorities and Europol may consult the Common Identity Repository 
(CIR).24 Biometric and biographic information of asylum seekers will also be made available to 
authorities responsible for investigating, detecting and/or prosecuting serious crime or 
terrorism through the Common identify repository (CIR), and the Multiple Identity Detector 
(MID).  
The Interoperability Regulations also foresee an expansion of the factual circumstances 
justifying police authorities’ access to specific categories of data (biometric and alphanumeric) 
contained in the above-mentioned databases, and accessible through the common identity 
repository (CIR) for identification-related purposes. Prior to the entry into force of the 
interoperability framework, law enforcement authorities’ access to migration and asylum 
databases (EURODAC, VIS, EES, ETIAS) was not allowed for the performance of police checks 
directed at identification of verification of identity of individuals within the Schengen territory 
for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences 
or the execution of criminal penalties. Only searches of (alphanumeric and biometric) data 
contained in the SIS were allowed to perform such activities (Figure 3 below).  
With interoperability, law enforcement authorities are instead likely to regain functions – most 
notably those related to immigration control and the policing of mobility of migrants and 
asylum seekers – that they had lost since the implementation of the Schengen system. In fact, 
Article 20 of the Regulation introduces the possibility for member states’ designated police 
authority to carry out queries of the CIR “solely for the purpose of identifying a person” in the 
following circumstances: 
a) where a police authority is unable to identify a person due to the lack of a travel 
document or another credible document proving that person’s identity; 
b) where there are doubts about the identity data provided by a person; 
c) where there are doubts as to the authenticity of the travel document or another 
credible document provided by a person; 
d) where there are doubts as to the identity of the holder of a travel document or of 
another credible document; or  
e) where a person is unable or refuses to cooperate.25 
 
 
24 The CIR shall provide to designated authorities and Europol a reply in the form of a reference as referred to in 
Article 18(2), indicating which of those EU information systems contains matching data, and a reference to the EU 
information systems to which the data belong. The reply shall be used for the purpose of submitting a request for 
full access to the underlying databases (in accordance with the procedures of those systems). 
25 Article 20, paragraph 1 of the Interoperability Regulations. 
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Figure 3. Law enforcement authorities’ (LEAs) access to databases for police checks without 
and with interoperability 
  
Source: Authors' own elaboration. 
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Where the query indicates that data on that person are stored in the CIR, the police authority 
shall have access to consult the data referred to in Article 18(1) of the Interoperability 
Regulations (Figure 3 above). 
Interoperability, in substance, will allow police authorities to make inferences derived from the 
information obtained via CIR consultations, and to take decisions based on the reference 
indicating the underlying database(s) where the data are stored. These new operational powers 
appear problematic in different respects. 
First, the possible overuse of interoperability components such as the CIR for conducting police 
checks might lead to a de facto reintroduction of systematic border controls. While similar 
issues have already been flagged with regard to the way in which SIS II is currently used by 
police authorities within the Schengen Area (Guild et al., 2016), interoperability might create 
further tensions with the Schengen Border Code and EU freedom of movement acquis. 
Second, the fact that interoperability will by design allow the interconnection of law 
enforcement databases with migration and asylum ones might lead member state law 
enforcement authorities to carry out checks on specific groups of people identified on the basis 
of grounds such as ethnicity and religion, with the consequent risk that the new technologies 
will be used as tools for discriminatory identity checks. The European Parliament has already 
expressed concerns with regard to the increasing vulnerability of both adults and children – 
especially of African descent – who are exposed to “the routine use of racial profiling, 
discriminatory stop-and-search practices and surveillance in the context of abuse of power in 
law enforcement, crime prevention, counter-terrorism measures, or immigration control” 
(European Parliament, 2019). 
Third, the range of new data processing operations allowed for by the Interoperability 
Regulations have led experts to note how their operationalisation will undermine the key data 
protection principle of purpose limitation,26 blurring – if not erasing – the lines between 
datasets designed to serve distinct purposes, such as border control and law enforcement 
(Silvestri, 2018). 
4.3 Capturing asylum authorities in the security continuum  
Interoperability will also change the ways in which a wide range of EU and member state first-
line authorities responsible for processing asylum applications, border control and migration 
management tasks perform their functions and carry out their daily work.  
 
26 The principle of purpose limitation, as defined in Article 5(1)(b) of the General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR), states that personal data must be “collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further 
processed in a manner that is incompatible with those purposes”. See Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing 
of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data 
Protection Regulation) (Text with EEA relevance) OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 1–88. 
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First of all, data gathered into EURODAC during identification and registration of international 
protection seekers and the processing of asylum claims by member state authorities might at 
all times be used in the context of checks conducted by law enforcement authorities across the 
EU (see Figure 4 below). Interoperability will also enable another functionality that consists in 
the possibility for borders, asylum, immigration authorities having access to at least one of the 
pre-existing databases, to query the European Search Portal (ESP) to ascertain whether the 
data of an individual being checked (in the context of processing but also law enforcement-
related activities) are stored in any of the existing databases (Figure 4 below).  
The new large-scale information-gathering and analysis systems introduced by the 
Interoperability Regulations are thus de facto turning EU and national authorities in charge of 
asylum border and migration management into law enforcement actors. They also become law 
enforcement data users at the moment when they have access (including indirectly) to 
information stored by police and other security players across the EU. Interoperability will thus 
perpetuate and reinforce the long-standing misinterpretation of human mobility as a security 
problem by the mean of capturing asylum authorities into a law enforcement framework that 
artificially identifies asylum seekers as potential security threats. This move reflects what Bigo 
has called the (in)security continuum (Bigo, 2002; Bigo, 1996). 
Figure 4. EURODAC and interoperability as policing tools 
Source: Authors' own elaboration. 
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At the same time, the extension of a data-driven police and criminal justice approach to 
refugees raises the question of interoperability’s compliance with international refugee law and 
specifically, the non-penalisation of irregular entry of bona fide asylum claimants enshrined in 
Art 31 of the 1951 Refugee convention. Handling and processing of EURODAC data in the 
context of police activities appears in disconformity with the faithful application of Art 31 of 
the Convention, as it creates an artificial and dangerous association between asylum seekers 
and potential criminals, a criminalisation dynamic similar to the one produced by current EU 
legislation on the facilitation of irregular migration (Carrera et al., 2018b). 
Before the entry into force of the Interoperability Regulations, the European Data Protection 
Supervisor (EDPS, 2018) noted that “facilitating the access by law enforcement authorities to 
non-law enforcement systems (even to limited information such as a hit/no hit) is far from 
insignificant from a fundamental rights perspective”. The EDPS also recalled how different 
“systems have been set up and developed in view of the application of specific policies and not 
as a law enforcement tool. Routine access would represent a violation of the principle of 
purpose limitation. It would entail a disproportionate intrusion in the privacy of for instance 
travellers who agreed to their data being processed in order to obtain a visa, and expect their 
data to be collected, consulted and transmitted for that purpose”.  
4.4 eu-LISA and Frontex: new powers beyond technical management  
EU JHA agencies, notably Frontex and eu-LISA may be considered as the main ‘winners’ of the 
new interoperability framework. Interoperability reflects a trend towards multi-purpose data 
and information processing schemes, which is nurtured by ‘an attitude of data-sharing by 
default’ among the Union’s law enforcement authorities (Bigo et al., 2012). In this context, EU 
agencies increasingly play the role of ‘knowledge producers’, for example through the 
production of migration statistics, the elaboration of scenarios on future migration flows, and 
the visualisation of migration routes used by migrants, as is the case in Frontex Risk Analysis 
Reports (Horii, 2016). 
And yet, previous examinations of EU security and migration data management instruments 
and policies have shown how information collected and processed by calculation and statistical 
correlation with the aim of producing risk assessments and risk profiles is highly controversial, 
most notably because it produces ‘probabilistic knowledge’ (Bigo et al, 2012). Statistics showing 
that a particular group of individuals has a higher chance of being involved in an unlawful (or 
even criminal) activity will justify that profilers focus their efforts on that particular group. In 
the field of law enforcement more specifically, profiling is used ‘to select’ a group of people as 
a potential ‘risk’ or ‘threat’ – such as ‘high risk travellers’, ‘suspicious traveller’, the visa ‘over-
stayer’, etc., which may lead to discriminatory ethnic profiling (FRA, 2010).  
The reform of the eu-LISA agency is especially illustrative of the increasing role played by JHA 
agencies in data processing and knowledge production. On 9 November 2018, the European 
Council adopted the Commission’s proposal to strengthen eu-LISA's mandate, with the key aim 
of ensuring interoperability of EU information systems for migration, security and border 
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management.27 The revised eu-LISA mandate includes far-reaching operational, research and 
policy tasks, ranging from personal data processing, ensuring ‘data quality’ control, developing 
other large-scale IT systems, implementing research projects and testing pilot projects, as well 
as providing ad hoc operational support to member states facing “extraordinary security and 
migration challenges” in particular areas of their external borders (e.g. hotspots) (Carrera, 
2019). 
The expanding role played by eu-LISA in data processing raises a number of challenges 
concerning not only the impact on fundamental rights (and most notably privacy and data 
protection rights), but also with regard to non-discrimination. Some outstanding issues 
regarding the expanded mandates of the agency, in particular, should be highlighted. Already 
in 2017, in its observations on the Commission proposal for the revision of eu-LISA mandate, 
the EDPS recommended that such a revision should be “accompanied by a detailed impact 
assessment of the right to privacy and the right to data protection which are enshrined in the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU” (EDPS. 2017). This is because the information systems 
managed by the agency “contain very sensitive information about individuals” (EDPS, 2017).  
With regard to the interoperability of information systems, the EDPS recommended that, in the 
absence of clearly formulated policy objectives and of a comprehensive legal framework, all 
references to interoperability should be deleted. The EDPS raised additional concerns about 
the possibility that the agency could develop and host a common centralised solution for large-
scale IT systems, which are in principle decentralised, maintaining that such changes require 
the revision of the appropriate legislative basis, which should be accompanied by adequate 
impact assessment and feasibility studies. The fundamental issues raised by the EDPS, in 
particular the implications on data privacy and protection, continue to remain relevant after 
the entry into force of the revised eu-LISA Regulation. 
Concerns also emerge from the analysis of the 2016 proposal for the EURODAC recast and the 
expanded data processing powers it would entrust to eu-LISA. For instance, Art. 9 of the 
proposal foresees the possibility for the agency to share statistical data obtained from 
EURODAC with other relevant Justice and Home Affairs Agencies for analysis and research 
purposes.28 Furthermore, new provisions are included in Art. 5(1) that would allow eu-LISA to 
use “real personal data” when testing the Central System for diagnostics and repair, as well as 
the use of new technologies and techniques. These new forms of data processing would only 
be allowed when the data is anonymised, and the information concerned could not be used for 
individual identification. However, they would also reduce the transparency and foreseeability 
 
27 Regulation (EU) 2018/1726 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 November 2018 on the 
European Union Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice (eu-LISA), and amending Regulation (EC) No 1987/2006 and Council Decision 2007/533/JHA 
and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1077/2011, OJ L 295, 21.11.2018, p. 99–137. 
28 Statistics produced by eu-LISA for these purposes should not report any names, individual date of births, or any 
personal data that would individually identify a data subject. 
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of the ways in which sensitive data of vulnerable individuals are handled and processed. In such 
a context, data subjects would de facto be deprived of the ownership of their data. 
A further major lacuna of the revised eu-LISA Regulation, which has not been taken into 
consideration by co-legislators, is the lack of any complaint procedure or mechanism before 
any EU agencies, such as the EDPS or the European Ombudsman, for individuals affected by 
fundamental rights violations in the context of any of these new responsibilities. This is in spite 
of the fact that a number of stakeholders, first of all the EU Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA), 
recommended the establishment of an “EU-wide request handling mechanism” at the eu-LISA 
agency to manage requests to access, correct and delete data as well as to provide data 
subjects with the information they need (FRA, 2018a).  
4.5 Risks of arbitrariness, discrimination, and the tension with fundamental rights  
The envisaged system of EU interoperable databases and information exchange systems will 
play an increasingly crucial role in controlling and managing human mobility, including that of 
refugees and asylum seekers engaging in the onward movements within the Schengen Area. 
Data collected and collated through existing databases will make it possible to conduct checks 
on individuals, regardless of their status, along the entirety of their journeys, from the time 
preceding entry into the Schengen Area to the moment when they cross the EU external 
border, but also during their stay within the Schengen Area, and until their (voluntary or forced) 
departure. 
For instance, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (EBCG, also known as Frontex) – 
which currently has no access rights to the VIS, ECRIS-TCN and EURODAC (Figure 5 below) – has 
called for aligning access rights of the Agency’s team members with those of national 
authorities “performing equivalent tasks” in the context of joint operations.29  
Becoming part of the interoperability framework, Frontex will be given the possibility to use 
some of the new system’s tools and functionalities to perform its tasks. For instance, Frontex 
agents will be able to query the European Search Portal (ESP), and consequently see whether 
the data of an individual is already stored in databases to which they previously had no access 
(Figure 5 below). 
At the same time, in a context where the arena of actors participating in the interoperability 
framework becomes increasingly populated, greater risks of mistakes, misbehaviour, and 
malpractice are likely to arise, affecting the rights and status of refugees and asylum seekers in 
the EU. 
 
29 “Non-paper by Frontex on its access to central EU systems for borders and security”, LIMITE doc no: 15174-17, 
pdf, available at http://www.statewatch.org/news/2017/dec/eu-council-frontex-non-paper-access-databases-
15174-17.pdf.  
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Figure 5. Frontex team members’ access to databases without and with interoperability 
  
Source: Authors' own elaboration. 
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Previous research has shown that, already at the stage of fingerprinting of third country 
nationals whose data will be inserted in the EURODAC system, a large margin of discretion (if 
not arbitrariness) is left to border guards or law enforcement officers as to the definition of the 
category under which an individual is classified (Ferraris, 2017). Authorities in charge of 
fingerprinting decide whether to channel migrants either into the category of asylum seekers 
or those “irregularly crossing the external border”. 
Analysis of EURODAC statistics shows that different ‘categorisation approaches’ are adopted 
depending on where fingerprinting of new arrivals from identical migratory routes is 
conducted. Third country nationals having entered the EU from the so-called Balkan route are 
more likely to be labelled as irregular migrants in countries such as Hungary or Greece, if 
compared with other EU member states such as Germany or Sweden (Ferraris, 2017).  
However, categorisation in the country of first arrival has a crucial impact on the fate of asylum 
seekers. Initiatives such as the Migrant Files project have for instance found that “at least ten 
people a year are wrongly deported due to false system hits in the fingerprint ID scanning 
devices”. The true number may be, however, “far higher”.30 Against this backdrop, the proposal 
to expand the possibility to store data of irregular migrants into EURODAC (for a period of five 
years) appears even more problematic. Data inputted wrongly (e.g. mistakenly categorising an 
asylum seeker as an irregular migrant) would lead to false system hits and potentially even 
generate ‘false identities’. Such results would clearly produce very serious consequences for 
the individuals concerned.  
The FRA already warned against the potential negative effects on the fundamental rights of 
migrants that may derive from the expanded possibilities given to national and EU agencies 
authorities to take immigration or law enforcement decisions on the basis of previous 
determinations regarding irregular entry or stay, specifically in the case of asylum seekers and 
children (FRA, 2018b). New errors are, however, likely to arise in a context where EURODAC 
data become part of the interoperability system, which allows migration and asylum data to be 
collated with information contained in databases such ETIAS and VIS (based on risk indicators 
operationalised into screening rules or algorithms) and used in conjunction with SIS (in the 
context of crime-fighting and counter-terrorism activities).  
Interoperability is likely to magnify the impact of not only flawed administrative decisions, but 
also spelling mistakes, insufficient information provided by the person, instructions not 
followed, cultural norms for reporting age, lack of interpretation, and accuracy issues in 
national databases (if data are taken from these) (Silvestri, 2018). Against such a backdrop, the 
proposal made in the 2016 proposal for EURODAC reform to inflict sanctions to individuals 
refusing to hand over their data to EU and member states asylum and immigration authorities 
appears particularly problematic. 
A key question that remains unresolved is whether a generalised use of asylum seekers’ and 
migrants’ data for the purpose of combating crime and terrorism complies with the EU data 
 
30 See ‘The migrants’ Files’ website, http://www.themigrantsfiles.com/  
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protection principles of necessity and proportionality (Vavolula, 2019). And yet, recent field 
research conducted in EU ‘first arrival countries’ such as Italy have already identified normative, 
technological and bureaucratic bias in the ways in which identity systems such as EURODAC are 
fed and utilised, including with regard to the classification of vulnerable communities and the 
inconsistent collection of migrants’ identity information (Latonero et al., 2019). The same 
research confirms that migration management and security technologies that rely on identity 
and biometric data (rather than on actual past behaviours and criminal records) introduce a 
new ‘socio-technical’ layer that may exacerbate existing biases, discrimination, and power 
imbalances. 
Against such a background, the proposal to reduce the age threshold (i.e. six years old) above 
which EURODAC registrations become compulsory appears especially problematic. The FRA has 
also highlighted problems associated with registration procedures of children for immigration 
purposes. When looking at practices related to the collection of data during visa applications 
or for the purpose of the Dublin system, the FRA found that the rights of children were in fact 
affected in multiple ways, including as a consequence of child-unfriendly treatment, issues 
related to the quality and reliability of fingerprints, and the risk of re-traumatisation. These 
challenges might well be further exacerbated by the proposed inclusion of additional categories 
of personal data (e.g. face images) into EURODAC foreseen by proposal for a reform of 
EURODAC.   
Another crucial privacy issue relates to the possibility for migrants and asylum seekers to access 
remedies in case of errors of misuse of their data. Lack of information of data subjects about 
their rights is particularly relevant in the case of asylum seekers. Asylum seekers are often held 
in detention in border areas, hotspots and closed detention centres (Danish Refugee Council, 
2019). In the context of hotspots in Italy and Greece, in particular, data collection is performed 
by officers from other member states under the supervision or the remit of EASO and Frontex, 
which themselves are not subject to national supervisory bodies. This circumstance creates a 
situation where responsibility becomes diffused and any remedy and safeguards are difficult to 
activate, rendering supervision and data control processes and access to rights materially very 
complicated.  
Interoperability is going to render the effectiveness of available legal and administrative 
remedies before competent oversight authorities guarantees even more difficult. It will be 
difficult for instance for a third country national deprived of personal liberty (e.g. in the context 
of ‘hotspots’) to be adequately informed about their rights under EU primary and secondary 
law. Reinforcing and streamlining the data collection process has not gone hand-in-hand with 
an equal attention to ensure safeguards of people involved, especially when it comes to 
empowering national control and supervisory data protection authorities so that GDPR and 
other applicable rules are complied with and accessible in practice. 
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5. Conclusion: Policy Options 
Option 1: De-securitising asylum seekers’ mobility 
EU policy responses to address onward movements of asylum seekers inside the EU are 
increasingly driven by a policing logic, which tends to portray intra-EU mobility as irregular and 
quasi-criminal. The high policy salience attached to the objective of preventing onward 
movements, however, contributes to reinforcing a narrow approach to this phenomenon based 
on deterrence, criminalisation and containment, instead of addressing and upholding its 
underlying causes.  
Onward movements in the EU should be de-securitised, paying due attention to asylum 
seekers’ agency and to the legitimate set of reasons they may have to lodge an application in a 
member state other than the one of first irregular arrival. The fact that a refugee, a beneficiary 
of subsidiary protection or an asylum seeker has moved onward (from a country in which she 
had or could have sought a form of international protection) does not in itself justify their being 
deprived of the set of rights and guarantees associated with their status. 
‘Trust’ in the functioning of the CEAS cannot be taken for granted. Any individual assessment 
of asylum claims should not automatically presume the ‘safety’ of any EU member state, and 
therefore automatically reject accessibility to asylum procedures by applicants. There can be 
no ‘blind trust’ among EU member states on the basis that any of them can be considered a 
priori ‘safe’ for any individual asylum seeker. Applications for asylum in a member state 
different from the one formally deemed as responsible by EU rules should not be automatically 
presumed as unfounded. These applications should instead be carefully examined in light of a 
notion of ‘safety’ grounded in international refugee and human rights law.  
The ‘human rights test’ to be applied in the case of Dublin transfers should be based on a 
broader notion of ‘safety’ grounded in both international refugee and human rights law, and 
current EU asylum law. This understanding of safety should encompass a number of conditions, 
including the absence of degrading reception and living conditions leading to destitution, 
protection against exclusion from social assistance or conditions leading to extreme material 
poverty, protection against systemic and institutionalised discrimination and xenophobia 
against asylum seekers and foreigners.  
Option 2: Asylum seekers’ agency: an individual humanitarian clause  
Previous academic and policy proposals on a possible reform of the Dublin system that 
incorporate respect of asylum seekers’ agency have studied the advantages of establishing a 
'free choice’ model. It has been argued that a system based on the free and informed choice of 
the applicant would make it possible to drastically reduce the use of coercive methods that 
characterise current Dublin transfers, while also reducing bureaucratic complexity, frequent 
litigation and implementation challenges typical of the current system (Maiani, 2016). 
Other policy contributions have put forward a ‘limited choice’ model that would allow 
applicants to select among ‘a reasonable range of options’ (Guild et al., 2015). The 2017 
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European Parliament proposal for a reform of the Dublin system (the so-called Wikström 
Report) went into this direction by granting asylum applicants “who do not have genuine links 
with a particular member state” the option to choose between the four member states which 
have received the lowest amount of applicants in relation to their ‘fair share’ (calculated on the 
basis of population and GDP) (European Parliament, 2017b). As a complement to a limited 
choice system, academic studies have explored the potentials of ‘preference matching’ models, 
which would allow incorporating asylum seekers’ preferences for the member state of 
destination, as well as member states’ preferences regarding potential applicants, into 
allocation systems based on pre-agreed quotas (Jones and Teytelboym, 2017; Rapoport and 
Fernández-Huertas Moraga, 2014).31 
While the advantages of ‘free-choice’ or limited choice models compared to the current EU 
Dublin system should be recognised, these models risk reinforcing a securitised understanding 
of asylum seekers’ mobility as something voluntary and unrelated to protection needs. On the 
contrary, in this Paper we have argued that asylum seekers exercising intra-EU mobility often 
neither have a 'free choice' nor a ‘privileged preference’ when moving to another member 
state. They are often forced to travel inside the EU for well-founded and legitimate reasons, 
which may include dysfunctional asylum systems, degrading reception and living conditions, 
social exclusion, poverty, lack of secure residence, institutionalised discrimination and lack of 
lasting life opportunities. 
Another potential drawback associated specifically to ‘preference-matching’ models is that 
they foresee a ‘choice’ or option for states to ‘rank’ asylum seekers they wish to accept based 
on a set of pre-defined preferences (to be ‘matched’ with asylum seekers’ preferences about 
their state of destination). While matching systems do not prescribe which principles states 
should be allowed to use when ‘ranking’ asylum seekers, their use in the context of EU policies 
may indirectly lend support to states’ discriminatory and restrictive admission practices.  
States’ freedom to select the profiles of asylum seekers they want to receive is limited by their 
obligations under international refugee and human rights law, and the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights when applying EU asylum law. States cannot select asylum applicants on 
the basis of their nationality, ethnic origin or religion, or even their ‘recognition rates’, as was 
the case in the 2015 EU ‘emergency relocation decisions’. Selection based on these grounds 
would amount to indirect discrimination against individuals, falling directly under the scope of 
Article 21 EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, and which, as the CJEU has recently confirmed, is 
illegal under EU law.32 
 
31 A detailed proposal of how a matching system for asylum seekers (or refugee) would work is provided by Jones 
and Teytelboym (2017).  According to the authors, under the proposed system “participating States and refugees 
would give their preferences – over which refugees they most wish to host or which State they most wish to be 
protected in – to a centralised clearinghouse that matches them according to those preferences” (p. 8). 
32 See joined cases C-643/15 and C-647/15, Slovak Republic and Hungary v Council of the European Union, 6 
September 2017, par. 304-305. 
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An alternative approach to address the current protection gaps of the Dublin system, while not 
delving into the question of how to structurally reform its allocation model,33 would be to 
explore the possibility to revise the scope and rationale of the so-called humanitarian clause 
envisaged in Art. 17.2 of the Dublin Regulation. In its current form, the humanitarian clause 
envisages the possibility for a member state responsible for examining an asylum claim to 
request another member state to take charge of an applicant on humanitarian grounds, based 
in particular on family or cultural considerations.34 
The suggested revision of the ‘humanitarian clause’ would imply overcoming its current ‘state-
to state’ design and enlarge it by granting an individual asylum seeker the possibility to directly 
activate the mechanism for requesting any other EU member state to take charge of their 
asylum claim based on humanitarian grounds. In order to make the process swifter and 
consideration of the evidence impartial, the envisaged European Union Asylum Agency (EEAA) 
(whose mandate is still under negotiation) could be tasked to manage the process, including 
the task of taking preliminary decisions on asylum seekers’ transfer requests, which should then 
be validated by the authorities of the requested member state based on simplified and 
accelerated procedures.35 
The entire process should be designed and implemented in a way which is fully in line with the 
right to seek asylum enshrined in Article 18 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. To that 
aim, the ‘mediating role’ or mandate played by the EUAA in the process should be linked to 
protection-related priorities under Article 18 of the Charter and not influenced by migration 
management objectives. The whole process should be supervised by an adequate monitoring 
system, entrusted to an actor independent from EASO such as a monitor under the EU 
Fundamental Rights Agency. 
The ‘individual humanitarian Clause’ outlined above would allow asylum seekers to challenge 
the obligation to remain in a member state where their safety is at risk, while respecting their 
agency regarding the member state of destination. As such, it could effectively contribute in 
creating the conditions for upholding the right to seek asylum in the EU in accordance with the 
standards laid down in the EU Treaties and provided by EU asylum legislation. This proposal 
may be helpful to shift the focus away from the current predominant framing of asylum 
seekers’ mobility in terms of ‘voluntary choices’ or ‘individual preferences’, towards paying 
 
33 For a review of alternatives to the Dublin system see Maiani (2016), p. 45. 
34 Studies conducted so far have concluded that divergent interpretation by member states of what constitutes 
valid humanitarian grounds for transfer have represented an obstacle to the application of the humanitarian 
clause in practice (Jurado et al., 2016: p. 35). While recognising that the humanitarian clause has been seldom 
applied in practice, UNHCR concludes that it represents a key safeguard in a system that duly upholds the principle 
of family unity and the best interest of the child and recognises the importance of family and other connections 
to a State, including as a vehicle for integration (UNHCR, 2017: p. 8).    
35 In light of current divergences among member states on what constitute valid humanitarian grounds for 
applying the humanitarian clause, the envisaged revision should be accompanied by a clear definition of the 
criteria and conditions to be fulfilled for obtaining transfer based on the humanitarian clause. This revision would 
also require to fundamentally rethink the approach taken by the Commission in its 2016 proposal for reforming 
the Dublin Regulation, which narrowed the scope of the existing humanitarian clause to family considerations by 
deleting references to “humanitarian grounds” (European Commission, 2016b, Art. 19). 
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more attention to the humanitarian protection-driven reasons that asylum seekers may have 
to pursue onward movements within the EU.  
Option 3: avoiding further expansion of the interoperability framework to limit 
potential violations of asylum seekers’ and migrants’ fundamental rights 
The increased data processing and access powers entrusted by the interoperability framework 
to law enforcement authorities at the national and EU levels call for a close scrutiny of 
accountability and the gaps in legal protection that are left in the system. Interoperability will 
lead to an asymmetry in access rights by third country nationals and asylum seekers. There is a 
real risk that EU databases will be overused by police authorities for identity checks inside the 
Schengen territory, based on dubious grounds, and which would amount to quasi-systematic 
border checks contrary to EU borders law. The EU should set up a systematic and permanent 
monitoring system of EU member states’ police checks falling within the scope of the Schengen 
Borders Code by including a reporting and statistical component in the SIS II (Carrera et al., 
2018a).  
It would be crucial to identify the availability and effectiveness of complaint mechanisms and 
administrative and legal remedies available to migrants and asylum seekers whose rights might 
be directly or indirectly affected by the new regulations. The interoperability framework should 
be implemented in a way that guarantees interoperable justice, taking the shape of 
independent and effective complaint mechanisms before competent national authorities and 
EU agencies such as Frontex and eu-LISA (in relation to for example the quality of data). Despite 
its role as ‘coordinator’ and manager, eu-LISA could be co-responsible for fundamental rights 
violations linked to wrong or false data. The current mandate of the agency is particularly weak 
as regards legal, democratic and judicial accountability in comparison to other EU agencies and 
should be revised according to identified needs. 
EU data protection law and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights ensure that ownership of 
data belongs to individuals – irrespective of their citizenship and migration status, and not to 
states or national authorities (Bigo, Isin and Ruppert, 2019). With the Interoperability 
Regulations already adopted, it is also central to invest in initiatives directed at raising migrants 
and asylum seekers’ awareness about their rights as data subjects. Furthermore, the EU should 
invest in specialised training for legal professionals that provide assistance or information on 
privacy rights to undocumented migrants, asylum seekers, and refugees.  
Without a clear understanding of the exact implications of the new interoperability framework 
and its exact implementation, there should not be any further expansion of the purposes and 
functions of other EU databases such as EURODAC. In order to avoid instances such as in certain 
experiences in the operation of the Schengen Information System II (Parkin, 2011), the 
implementation of the interoperability framework should be subject to close monitoring and 
democratic scrutiny, paying specific attention to the proportionality, necessity and 
fundamental rights impacts of any new functionalities and related costs.  
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